Lukashenko has been accused of suppressing opposition candidates and unfair elections. Just recently, in the 2010 presidential election, two presidential candidates were seriously beaten by police. On election night, rioters and protesters inundated the capital in a wave of over 10,000 people, which resulted in the arrests of seven opposition presidential candidates. Lukashenko dubiously won reelection with 79.65% of the vote. Consequently, his inauguration was boycotted by EU diplomats with only 32 foreign diplomats in attendance.

Following the elections, authorities raided the offices and homes of hundreds of opposition leaders, democratic activists, and civil society organizations across the country. Although the Belarusian constitution calls for freedom of speech and press, individuals cannot criticize the government publicly, wear masks, or display unregistered flags and symbols. Insulting the president or even insulting Belarus abroad could result in multiple years in prison. The Information Ministry can suspend newspapers for three months without a court ruling. Police crackdowns have been common after local and foreign journalists reported being victims of physical violence during a 2010 incident. Multiple journalists have disappeared and are still unheard of, leading to suspicions that Lukashenko had them kidnapped. A 2010 Reporters Without Borders ranking put Belarus at 154 out of 178 in its 2010 Press Freedom Index.

President Lukashenko’s authoritarian rule has also directly threatened American lives. In 2008, American attorney Emanuel Zeltser and his assistant Vladlena Funk were kidnapped in London by Belarusian KGB agents. The two were flown to Belarus and imprisoned and tortured for over a year, while Lukashenko proclaimed that the two would not be released until the United States lifted sanctions against him. Although there has been no official response to the release of the hostages, it is believed that the U.S. State Department made a deal to provide IMF credits to Belarus.

Lukashenko is also known to have made highly controversial statements. According to The Jerusalem Post, Lukashenko stated in 1995, “The history of Germany is a copy of the history of Belarus. Germany was raised from ruins thanks to firm authority and not everything connected with that well-known figure Hitler was bad. German order evolved over the centuries and attained its peak under Hitler.” In addition, Lukashenko infamously insulted openly gay German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle in 2012, stating, “better to be a dictator than gay.” Lukashenko’s corruption and agenda to undermine the desire of the Belarusian people for true democracy extend far beyond the aforementioned human rights violations. Having been an ardent supporter of relations with Russia and even having voted against the independence of Belarus from the Soviet Union, Lukashenko remains one of the worst violators of human rights. The United States and others must continue to push for democracy and freedom in the imprisoned nation.

In 2011, the Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act of 2011 was signed into law by President Obama. The act reaffirmed the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004, which authorizes the assistance and promotion of democracy, human rights, and rule of law in the Republic of Belarus. Although relations between the European Union and Belarus were improved in 2008, they once again turned sour in 2012 as the EU announced another year of sanctions against individuals and companies linked to the government. The EU cited the failure of an improvement in human rights by Lukashenko’s government. Additionally, the EU called for the release of all political prisoners and declared that refusal to do so would result in continued sanctions.  More attention, pressure, and sanctions from other nations must be placed on Belarus to hasten the implementation of real democracy. Without this, the status quo will be allowed to prevail and Belarus will remain a democratic dictatorship for many years to come.

This article originally appeared in the spring edition of PPR.

Photo credit: Flickr user Cancillería Ecuador

By: Gregory Segal

In December 1991, after over 45 years of bitter rivalry with the United States, the Soviet Union suddenly disappeared from the world map.  With the Soviet Union’s abrupt disintegration, Americans quickly believed that the Cold War, and the era it entailed, rapidly ended along with it.  As President George H. W. Bush said in a June 1992 press conference, “The Cold War days are over.”

Without question, the Cold War as an international conflict ended with the USSR’s demise; however, the persistence of its impact on American politics is often neglected.  Upon further examination, the decades spent waging the political and cultural battles of the Cold War transformed American political culture, installing new norms and values that remain present in the United States today.  A prime example of this lies in the current political paralysis of the United States government in crafting domestic policy; the persistence of Cold War-era beliefs makes it more difficult for the country’s leaders to effectively govern.

In January 2013, soon after President Obama’s inauguration for a second term, Representative Paul Broun of Georgia remarked, “I think the only constitution that Barack Obama upholds is the Soviet Constitution, not this one.”  Labeling President Obama as a socialist or communist is not a new phenomenon; it reflects a custom among American politicians, born in the Cold War era, of accusing their opponents of secretly advocating for the realization of these ideologies.  For instance, during the 2012 Presidential Election, the formerly leading candidate, Governor Rick Perry of Texas, asserted in a debate, “I make a very proud statement and a fact that we have a president that’s a socialist.” Even Governor Mitt Romney, the Republican Party’s nominee for president, aired an ad intended for Spanish-speaking voters that featured Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro’s niece endorsing President Obama.  While the Cold War may be over, this practice demonstrates how the process of accusing a public individual of being a communist or socialist still permeates American political discourse.  The use of these Cold War anxieties serves as a political tool for politicians to dissuade voters from voting for their opponents.

The Cold War also shapes the United States’ attitude toward defense spending.  Without question, in the aftermath of World War II, the rivalry with the Soviet Union led to an incredible buildup of the U.S. Armed Forces.  With nuclear war as a plausible reality, the need for a strong military became an important concern for citizens.  While the threat of the Soviet Union may be eliminated, hesitancy to lower the level of defense has remained since the end of the Cold War. The effect implied here is, perhaps, best summarized by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1961, when he warned the nation of the dangers of a “Military-Industrial Complex.” He argued that the military and defense industry would become intrinsically connected to the government and politicians, making it difficult for the government to detach itself from defense spending.  In this speech, he said, “This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence — economic, political, even spiritual — is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government.”  While the arms race of the Cold War has drawn to a close, the unwillingness to cut defense spending continues, as Eisenhower warned.  Even as the country faces an urgent deficit crisis, dialogue regarding altering defense spending remains influenced by this military-industrial complex. Take the recent Presidential campaign as an example: In October 2012, Governor Romney noted,  “I don’t think you cut military [spending] for purposes of balancing a budget,” while in a debate on foreign policy, President Obama noted that his budget would not be “reducing our military spending — it is maintaining it.”  Without question, neither politician wanted to seem as though he were making the country vulnerable by cutting defense spending.  Because the country is so intrinsically tied to the defense industry, it is more difficult for the nation to pragmatically consider all options on the table to reducing the government deficit.

The Cold War also has a lasting effect on the qualities Americans seek in a President.  While the Cold War may be long over, citizens still look for leaders who assume the persona of a “cold warrior.”  The image of presidents from the Cold War, steadfast and uncompromising, continues to provide the mold for present-day candidates.  While this is a popular model for what defines a strong president, the willingness to compromise becomes perceived as a sign of weakness.  This encourages politicians to become more unwavering in their positions and be less willing to adapt to changing circumstances and situations.  In a world without a single, clear ideological enemy, the manner in which a leader approaches diplomacy is too complex for this archetype to endure.  By insisting on uncompromising leaders, Americans encourage politicians at all levels to take on these attitudes, impeding the government’s ability to come to agreements on important domestic and global issues.

As the next generation of voters reaches adulthood, the ability to recognize these aspects of American political culture is vital.  Since today’s young voters did not grow up during the Cold War, these beliefs will seem entirely foreign.  To combat the paralyzing impact of these beliefs, voters must understand their origins and allow their country to move beyond its entrenchment in the political practices of the past in order to promote social, economic, and diplomatic progress in the future.

This article originally appeared in the spring edition of PPR.

Photo credit: Flickr user Cybjorg

Countries all over Europe have been struggling with similar problems since 2008. Italy and Greece have both faced high tax evasion rates and resorted to ever more restrictive ways of cracking down. In an effort to curb the cash economy, which reduces the ability of the state to tax economic activity, Italy has imposed limits on the amount of cash that can be withdrawn. It has also introduced the so-called redditometro (income-meter), an online tool that gives Italians rough estimates of what they should be paying. This latter anti-evasion effort became an issue during the recent electoral campaign, with the newly-rebranded populist Silvio Berlusconi attacking the Monti government for creating a police state. Meanwhile, French Minister Jerome Cahuzac has launched a campaign to combat tax evasion and collect an extra one billion euros in revenues. Finally, while the Greek government has promised to increase its tax revenues in an agreement with its international lenders, its problems have continued to multiply. Two reports by lender countries have determined that Greece has raised only half of the additional income needed and has performed only half of the audits it had planned. This failure to crack down on evasion has deepened social tensions by suggesting that the government is unwilling to go after the wealthy and prefers to increase the burden on the middle class. This build-up of resentment, coupled with governments’ attempts to scrape the bottom and collect any revenue they may have missed, suggests that these nations’ economic situations are unsustainable.

The economic problems on the revenue side of the equation are further compounded by the refusal of European governments to reform their approach to expenditures. After all, if governments were less profligate in their spending or increased their operational efficiency, the high taxes would be more acceptable. However, there has been no indication of either of these changes occurring. In France, President Hollande has continued with his high spending programs, undeterred. His clash to stop steelmaker ArcelorMittal from closing plants and laying off 600 employees suggests that Hollande is not willing to leave behind the big-government strategies pioneered by former Socialist President Francois Mitterand. Similarly, in the recent Italian campaign, all major parties promised tax reductions, especially in the dreaded IMU property tax, but have floated only minor and unconvincing plans to reform spending. Even Monti, who had been praised for giving Italy credibility abroad, has suggested his willingness to undo many of the actions he took to return Italy to a balanced budget. The likely major winner in Italy, the Democratic Party, has been running on a platform similar to Hollande’s, calling for more state involvement in the economy, more large-scale government programs, and stronger cooperation with Susanna Camusso, the leader of CGIL, the largest Italian Labor union.

The actions and programs of these European governments can be understood through the lens of Walter Russell Mead’s “Blue Social Model,” a combination of government intervention and cooperation with business and labor that characterized the United States in the 1950s and Europe throughout the post-war era. While Mead applied this model to American politics, it is clear that his world of stable lifetime white- or blue-collar jobs, a growing state, earlier retirement, and shorter work hours also applies to Europe. Nevertheless, Europe also shows all of the deficiencies that Mead uses to suggest that the model is broken beyond repair. Indeed, the growing costs of unionization and the increasing fiscal pressure resulting from an aging population are in many ways far worse in Europe than they are in America.

Real change, though, looks difficult. Whenever a state has attempted to introduce modifications to its tax code or has started an austerity program, extreme parties promising an easy way out have emerged. Greece, the country that has suffered the most in the recent economic crisis, witnessed the rise of two radical parties in its most recent elections. On the left, the communist Syriza party has promised a painless end to the recession, free from any meaningful reforms to the state in terms of taxation, spending, and efficiency. On the right, the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn has resorted to the scapegoating of immigrants and minorities in order to attract the population mired in fiscal disillusionment. In Italy, the Movimento 5 Stelle (Five Star Movement) has emerged in response to the policies of Monti. The party has captured the Italian electorate’s anger at the government for the misuse of its money but failed to promote a meaningful agenda for change. Finally, even in France, which has not been subjected to any tough cuts or reforms, the far-right Front National, led by Marine LePen, has been gaining ground with its xenophobic messaging.

In this difficult climate, when deep reforms are needed and the specter of extreme political movements looms large, Europe desperately needs both a paradigm shift away from the old model and political actors who can convey to voters that the high-tax, high-spend model that voters are accustomed to is no longer feasible. These countries also need political parties that can convince voters that a new economic paradigm would not be the end of the world and that, if proper actions are taken, they could build a new path to prosperity. Most fundamentally, struggling European nations need to transcend the old divides of left and right that characterize most of the political discourse. A possible way forward has emerged in Italy, where the minority party Fare per Fermare il Declino (Action to Stop the Decline) has proposed a platform of lower taxes and reduced spending. The party’s leader Oscar Giannino has been regularly invoking the motto “Spezziamo le catene” (“Let’s break the chains”) to highlight the stifling effect high taxes have had on the country. However, while this movement may represent a way forward, it has failed to make a large impact on the national conversation.

When confronted with Europe’s difficult situation, one recalls a witty quip of the Italian writer Ennio Flaiano: “The political situation is bad, but it’s not serious.” It is time to get serious and find a new approach.

This article originally appeared in the spring edition of PPR.

Photo credit: Flickr user roberto gaioppa

By: Raquel Macgregor

After hearing Romney’s “I don’t want to go down the path to Spain” comment during the first U.S. 2012 presidential debate, I had to laugh at the irony of my choice of Seville, Spain for my semester abroad.  It seems I couldn’t have picked a worse time to live in Spain.  Poverty and unemployment are ubiquitous, there is widespread discontent with the government, and citizens are becoming desperate.  Spain is now bordering on the precipice of financial catastrophe.  Beginning when the housing bubble burst in 2008, the government has gone from surplus to massive deficit.  With unemployment wavering at around 25 – 40 percent for young adults, Spain’s economy barely has a pulse.  Unemployment in Andalucía, the region of Spain where I live, is close to 50 percent.  On top of that, the Spanish government has proposed a series of austerity measures in the public sector, including 40 billion euro (51.4 billion USD) in cuts, more than a quarter of Spain’s GDP.  These cuts include public sector salary freezes, tax increases, and departmental cuts across the board.  What do all these austerity measures breed? Public unrest, and lots of it.

The citizens are simply not happy with Prime Minister Rajoy’s “cut-all” approach. This year, there have been several protests involving hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in Madrid and Barcelona.  My recent trip to Madrid was almost cancelled because of the thousands of protesters scheduled to march the road in front of my hotel.  Even living in Seville, a city numbering only 700,000 inhabitants, I have witnessed substantially sized bi-weekly protests.  At demonstrations, Spaniards protest against any number of cost-cutting measures including the introduction of co-pays on medication, teacher salary cuts, and university tuition increase.  Essentially citizens protest any and all cuts.  Last week I had to duck and push through thousands of protesters just to get home during an internationally coordinated strike.  The week before, school was closed for another anti-austerity protest.  Paros académicos (academic halts) and huelgas (protests) constantly threaten to close universities for weeks or even months.  Missing school for days at a time is not a question of if but of when. I fear losing a semester of school credit if the protests continue.

Essentially, protests have become a part of my life.  When I first arrived in Seville, the lively civil disobedience animated and engaged me.  The protests were loud, vivacious, yet rarely violent.  I would often join in and ask questions; I loved the political engagement of the citizens.  Lately, however, the constant barrage of protests has become mundane.  Every day of protest costs Spain millions in lost productivity.  Missed days of class threaten the integrity of the entire public education system.  Yet, the government has not changed its stance.  What exactly is the Spanish public seeking to realistically accomplish? Although the resentment towards the cuts is completely understandable, there is little discussion of a resolution.

Spain’s simplest solution for its economic crisis – leaving the euro – seems unlikely.  The nation’s membership in the EU holds its currency at an artificially high rate.  Before the formation of the eurozone, Spain and other economies in crisis could undervalue their currency to regain competiveness in the global market.  Doing this would increase exports and reduce Spain’s trade deficit, which would help boost the national economy.  However, Spain’s membership in the euro prevents this from happening, and moreover, most Spaniard’s don’t seem thrilled to return to a currency that reminds them of a time of dictatorship and oppression.  Besides, even if Spain returned to pesetas, it would be unlikely to pull them out of the $2.4 trillion hole they’ve dug.

The Spanish government is trying to solve its financial crisis through cuts and bailouts from the EU without addressing the underlying problem.  Throwing money at failing banks is no better than putting band-aids on a body in multi-system organ failure.  Instead, the government needs to couple austerity cuts with domestic investments. Spanish leaders should heed the example of President Obama’s efforts to reboot the economy in the United States.  Obama has not simply increased taxes- he has invested in the manufacturing industry, education, and clean energy.  He has created tax cuts for small businesses.  He has poured money into infrastructure.  It is true that all these actions cost money, but all investments start with a down payment.  Spain, unlike the United States, has not introduced any sound investment plans in their road to recovery.  With their only strategy being $51.4 billion in state spending cuts, Spanish leaders are milking their citizens dry.

Instead of protesting public service cuts, citizens should instead insist on investment.  Spaniards need to take responsibility for their politicians’ failed economic strategies and suggest viable solutions.  Investment in tourism, Spain’s largest industry, is one possible avenue.  Spain also has a highly skilled workforce; 39% of the population aged 25-34 has a graduate education.  The country should thus focus on investment in the more highly specialized and scientific jobs for which it is already known, such as the aerospace and automotive industries.  Spain must retain its talent, not just its agriculture.  Investment is necessary.  Simply applying public sector cuts will only further shut down the economy.

However, one may ask, can Spain afford to invest at this point?  The answer, surprisingly, has hardly been discussed at the public level.  In fact, citizens, politicians, and the media never seem to bring up solutions to the crisis so discussions on the feasibility of domestic investment has not had much critique on either side.  The press constantly criticizes government policies but establishes few suggestions on the right course of action.  It seems that Spain’s real problem is its lack of intellectual discussion on finding a solution.

As an American living in Spain, I am astounded that a talented student graduating with a Ph.D. in engineering has little to no job prospects.  I am saddened that entire families live off of the pension of a single grandparent.  I am amazed that 10% of homes in Spain stand idle and crumbling while newlyweds move in with their parents.  Something is fundamentally wrong here.  Spain needs change, not cuts.

This article originally appeared in the spring issue of PPR.

Photo credit: Flickr user maroussia

By: Casey Anderson

Two states in the United States recently passed measures legalizing the recreational use of marijuana. While this is treated as a somewhat comical situation in the U.S., it has unintended ramifications for foreign policy in Latin America with regards to the war on drugs. The United States has historically shaped drug policy in Latin America, ensuring the propagation of militant values in regards to production. 

Supply-Side Drug Enforcement

The U.S.’s “War on Drugs” has led to widespread military campaigns in Latin America to halt production. The publication of a controversial report written by the Global Commission on Drug Policy (partly composed of former Latin American heads of state) exposes the fundamental difference in assumptions underlying drug policies. While the Obama administration may have dropped the terminology “war on drugs,” it still follows the same policy prescriptions with the goal of reducing the availability of drugs. The ONDCP (Office of National Drug Control Policy) dictates that the mere availability of drugs spurs addiction. That supply creates its own demand.

This report advocates that recreational users who do not harm society should not be criminalized but instead treated and that legalization provides a pathway for decreased violence as a result of taking the product from black markets. The report concludes that addressing demand is the solution to problems of addiction and violence. A recent study of decriminalization efforts in Portugal found that there was a correlation between decriminalization of all drugs and decreased drug usage amongst teenagers, lower rates of HIV, decreased use of injection drugs, and a reduction of prison overcrowding.

This supply-side explanation, which argues that the best way to curb growth is to erect high barriers and increase regulations to production (If there is no supply, there will be no demand), is compelling, but it is based upon a very narrow and limited understanding of the problem that overlooks the nature of addiction, the goals of the sovereignty where drug production occurs, and the negative externalities of drug-related violence.

Negative Impacts

Focusing efforts on curbing production to reduce supply, as opposed to reducing demand by means of treatment programs, generates massive levels of violence, including civilian casualties. The Global Commission argues that the level of violence is an unacceptable regulatory spillover and a sign of failed policy.

Not only does the creation of black markets divert resources that could be used to promote economic growth, but the extreme violence also has negative consequences on growth.

While the destruction of crops has decreased the world supply of drugs, with decreased supply come increased prices (if there is no change in demand). Drugs are inelastic goods; regardless of price a drug user will continue to purchase drugs. Therefore, eliminating parts of the supply does not harm drug traffickers directly. Increased costs are passed on in the form of higher prices to consumers. Thus policies emphasizing decreasing demand are not precise in targeting traffickers, instead they bluntly attack this perceived threat without distinguishing between actors. This creates a situation where United States foreign policy is simply driving up drug prices for domestic consumers. Furthermore, because the source of the profit motivation is not removed, eradication efforts in one country simply divert production to another, ensuring the perpetuation of the problem of supply.

Referendum on Drug Policy

The legalization of marijuana in two American states serves as a referendum on what are seen as the perceived failures of the U.S. War on Drugs, sending a clear signal to Latin America that its militant policies are relaxing. This will spur liberalization efforts such as those prescribed by the Global Commission on Drug Policy.

At the Summit of the Americas in April 2012, traditional US allies such as Colombia began to advocate a change in the way drug usage is fought. With the Global Commission on Drug Policy declaring the “war” on drugs a failure, there is growing disapproval of US-led efforts that increase violence. The alternative would instead be increased efforts at treatment and government regulation. The incongruency between domestic and federal policy regarding drugs creates space for Latin American nations to revise their own policies.

Many Latin American leaders are arguing that the U.S. decriminalizing marijuana creates a clear internal contradiction between its domestic policy and foreign policy. The vote that resulted in the legalization of marijuana in two states is seen as the first ever relaxation of U.S. drug policy. Internationally, the Latin American community is abuzz with the implications, including the seeming begrudging approval of the U.S. to allow them to follow the liberalization prescriptions of the Global Commission report. Uruguay has already passed legislation to have the government act as a monopoly in the production and sale of marijuana to adults, and the PRD party leader in Mexico proposed new legislation in Mexico. While the widespread constituent support for legalization in the U.S. is somewhat of an anomaly, it is generally understood that source countries do not typically have high usage rates.

Legalization would decrease drug-related violence by introducing government regulation and transparency into traditionally black markets. The legalization of marijuana in two US states will cut into Mexican cartel profits by $1.6 billion. By moving the substance out of the domain of illegal groups, it is moved into the arena of formalized business transactions – in which the product, quantity and price is standardized. Individuals will opt for legal transactions over illegal ones because of the decrease in risk (and often decrease in price). This is a much more targeted way of harming cartels. By regulating the illicit product, cartels no longer have a monopoly over its production. The high prices of drugs are a result of the perceived risk that goes into their production and trafficking. Government intervention in this market reduces prices and increases transparency, eliminating the need for a black market and directly impacting the profits of cartels by diverting them to the government.

Conclusion 

Prohibition of drug use is part of an aged, expensive and inconsistent effort of the government to regulate morality, and it generates too many negative externalities in source countries. United States foreign policy will continue to reflect emphasis on decreasing supply because it is not directly affected by drug-related violence, but now Latin American nations will seemingly not support this since an internal contradiction between American state and foreign policy exists.  Legalization serves as an indicator of a relaxation in U.S. drug policy that will likely spur discussion of legalization in order to decrease violence in source countries. The results of Uruguay’s efforts will likely impact the speed of this shift.

This fundamental difference in the approach to the war on drugs is currently shaping discourse. The divide is between the United States who advocates eliminating supply, and Latin American leaders that argue for addressing demand. But recent successes in Portugal inspire optimism and offer a model for decriminalization. The United States’ insistence upon the Merida Initiative and Plan Colombia with the funds to match ensured the success of its supply-side narrative. But now that Colorado and Washington have taken it upon themselves to defy this argument and overturn a federal policy, in conjunction with growing discontent amongst Latin American leaders and a successful example of full decriminalization — what happens now? This referendum on the failure of the war on drugs could serve as the catalyst for the widespread changes in the global war on drugs that source countries have been advocating for.

Photo credit: Flickr user breathelaina

This article originally appeared in the winter edition of PPR on March 11, 2013.

By: Anthony Cruz

Under the leadership of Hugo Chavez, Venezuela has seen itself become a more prominent (and often controversial) participant in the international community.  In this capacity, Venezuela has also become more of a nuisance to American foreign policy, forging relations with many states that have records of acting as adversaries toward Washington.  Furthermore, Chavez has branded himself a revolutionary, opposing what he believes to be U.S. imperialism.

Following Chavez’s anti-American path are nations like Ecuador and Cuba.  After the infamous 2006 United Nations incident, where Chavez called then-President George Bush the devil, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa said, “Calling Bush the devil offends the devil. Bush is a tremendously dimwitted President who has done great damage to the world.”  Continuing on this anti-American path, Correa has also recalled his ambassadors to the United States a few times, as recently as 2011.  In addition, Correa, a University of Illinois graduate, even refused to renew a 10-year lease on a U.S. air base that had been used to conduct anti-drug surveillance in the Andes, and Correa and Chavez have collaborated on bi-national projects and companies related to oil and gas.   Adding to this, Chavez expelled the U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela in 2008, citing that the U.S. was, “fomenting a coup attempt against his socialist revolution.”  Correa followed suit and expelled the U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador in 2009 and 2011, for alleged involvement with Ecuadorian police, following the disclosure of U.S. diplomatic cables by Wikileaks, which said that his government was turning a blind eye on corruption.  Until this day, both continue their anti-U.S. rants and perpetually remain suspicious of the United States.

Hugo Chavez and Fidel and Raul Castro have become the best of friends. While in Havana in 1999, Chavez stated:

“Here we are, as alert as ever, Fidel and Hugo, fighting with dignity and courage to defend the interests of our people, and to bring alive the idea of Bolívar and Martí. In the name of Cuba and Venezuela, I appeal for the unity of our two peoples, and of the revolutions that we both lead. Bolívar and Martí, one country united!”

Both have made statements against U.S. imperialism and neoliberalism.  In addition, the two despotic governments have close military and economic ties.  The Cuban military, which has extensive Russian equipment, has been advising Caracas and attempting to rid it of American influence.  The two nations have an interesting doctors-for-oil agreement: Cuba has sent 30,000-50,000 personnel to Venezuela to help foster programs such as health care, education, science, and technology.  In return, Venezuela sends 53,000 barrel per day of oil to Cuba at friendly rates. Venezuelan assistance has also seen the revitalization of an oil refinery in Cuba’s city of Cienfuegos.  It is another example of Venezuela cozying up to an American adversary, especially one that is 90 miles away from the coast of Florida.

Going overseas, Chavez has aligned himself with arguably America’s biggest enemy: Iran.  Since 2001, the despotic Chavez has visited Iran on several occasions.  He stated that he will “stay by Iran at any time and under any condition.”  He added, “We are with you and with Iran forever. As long as we remain united we will be able to defeat (U.S.) imperialism, but if we are divided they will push us aside.”  Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad also once presented Chavez with Iran’s highest honor for “supporting Tehran in its nuclear standoff with the international community.”  Increased trade and air service between the two nations, combined with their inflammatory rhetoric, has concerned the House Foreign Affairs Committee.   In fact, the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 is currently before the House for consideration.  The Act is intended to “provide for a comprehensive strategy to counter Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere, and for other purposes.”

Chavez has also been a supporter of Palestine and Hezbollah, both vehement critics of Israel.  Chavez broke off relations with Israel due to the 2008-2009 Gaza War, which led Israel to follow suit in breaking off relations with Venezuela.  While Syrian President Omar al Bashir was visiting Venezuela in 2010, Chavez accused Israel of being “the assassin arm of the United States.”  Indeed, Israel is one of the closest allies of the United States and is one of the only nations to have voted at the UN in favor of the Cuban embargo proposed by the United States.  Chavez has also been “in bed” with the late Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi.  The two leaders had presented each other with the highest honors of their respective nations.  After Gadhafi’s death at the hands of Libyan rebels, Chavez stated, “Regrettably, Gadhafi’s death has been confirmed. He was murdered. Well, this is another attempt against life. What else can I say? … I will remember him all of my life as a great fighter, a revolutionary and a martyr.” Chavez also condemned the U.S. airstrikes during the Libyan Civil War as “madness,” and Hezbollah, the infamous Lebanese terrorist group, has thanked Chavez for his continued support of the Palestinian cause. Chavez iss, in fact, so closely allied with the Palestinians that in 2009 he stated, “We .. are on the side of the Palestinian people’s memorable struggle … against the genocidal state of Israel that knocks down, kills and aims to terminate the Palestinian people.” With Caracas welcoming Palestinians and Hezbollah with open arms, it is frightening to think that can find a safe haven within such close range.

Although the thought of Venezuela as a nuisance to American national security may seem inconsequential, there is good reason for such qualms. With inflammatory rhetoric and close ties with some of the world’s most corrupt and dangerous leaders, Hugo Chavez’s position as the head of a nation in the western hemisphere is utterly concerning.  Chavez may consider himself opposed to neoliberalism and American imperialism, but his foreign policy is ultimately meant to vex and contradict that of our great nation. 

Photo credit: Pan-African News Wire File Photos

This article was originally published in the winter edition of PPR on March 11, 2013.

By: Brian Liu

Despite China’s recent economic success, social and economic problems lie just beyond the horizon. These issues include an unsustainable economic model, a failed One-Child policy, and political corruption.  The burden of these problems now falls into the lap of Xi Jinping, China’s newly selected leader of the executive politburo committee. In order to remedy such problems, the Chinese government must make a series of political and economic reforms that strive toward a more liberal private market, as well as a more transparent and accountable government.

China’s economy has expanded at a blistering rate in recent years.  In 2007, China’s GDP grew at a rate of 14.3%. Millions of people have been pushed out of poverty and into a vastly growing middle class.  The standard of living as well as the standard of education has increased. Much of this rapid expansion was the result of a massive stimulus injected into the economy by the Chinese government that targeted housing and infrastructure. Such spectacular economic growth, however, is not all that it seems. A lot of this GDP growth is investment based and not consumption led growth.  These investments were mostly in housing and infrastructure. They, in fact, took up more than 48% of China’s GDP in 2011 and, more alarmingly, a disproportionate amount of this investment was done by state-controlled firms. This is troubling because it shows that it is not households, but rather the government that is bolstering GDP.  China’s economic model relies too heavily on the government and not enough on the private market.  The problem with such reliance is twofold.  The first is that it reduces GDP growth in the long run by restricting the creativity and innovation that is inherent in a more open market.  The second is that such unbalanced economic growth isn’t sustainable.

Another crisis may result from China’s One-Child policy.  This policy puts tremendous stress on China’s entitlement programs.  Because of severe reductions in population size, China’s working population is significantly smaller than its retiring one, placing tremendous financial stress on the current working class.  Furthermore, this reduction in the labor force as well as the effects of the stimulus package wearing off has reduced China’s GDP growth rate.  GDP fell from 11.9% to 8.9% in 2011, and many economists believe that it will continue to fall in the future.  This slowdown in economic activity as well as the growing debt from entitlement programs will put the Chinese government in a difficult position, especially as much of China’s GDP growth is based on the government’s investments. Already, China is facing social unrest because of a slowdown in GDP growth in recent quarters. The previous summer, for instance, in the city of Chongqing, thousands of protesters clashed with police in a violent riot, over the slowdown of the economy. Daniel Rosen, an economist and head of the Rhodium Group posits that China is at a juncture.  He argues that “If the [new leadership] doesn’t move quickly, the consequences will be clear and immediate.”

Moreover, the Chinese government faces a large problem with corruption, emphasized by Bo Xilal’s corruption scandal last summer, in which Mr. Bo funneled more than a billion dollars into offshore accounts. His wife, in order to cover up this corruption, had their British accountant murdered. While this may seem like an isolated event, corruption in China is more pervasive and more harmful than one would like to think.  Economists Zeng Zhonglu and David Forrest calculated that the average corrupt official or senior manager in a state-owned company took $3.3 million before getting caught.  Furthermore, the People’s Bank of China found, in recent years, that 18,000 officials have fled China with at least $120 billion in total stolen assets.  As John Osnos, the Chinese correspondent for The New Yorker concluded, “There is a difference between knowing [corruption] exists in the abstract and confronting the cold, blunt accounting—seeing the cars and tuition it buys, realizing the land that was seized to pay for it, and working out how those funds might have been used for better health care or education.”

Xi Jinping, in order to mitigate these problems, must make a series of reforms.  Economically, he must target a more liberal private market.  Free enterprise will contribute to China’s growth or, at the very least, alleviate the effects from a slowdown in GDP.  This is important because, as of now, the Chinese economic model isn’t sustainable.  The Chinese government can do this by breaking up some of the large state-owned companies to allow for more competition and economic activity.  By doing so, the government can transition from a more investment based economy to a consumer based one.  Furthermore, breaking up large state owned companies would take the burden of investments away from the government and to the private market.  Such a reform might lower China’s GDP in the short run, as it will take time for consumer based spending to pick up, but in the long run, it will put China on a more solvent economic path.

In light of the problems caused by the One-Child policy, China must reform its entitlement programs for the elderly.  The Chinese government should consider switching to a voucher based system.  This would lessen the pressure on China’s government as well as the working population.  They would need to be careful on how the voucher-based system is structured.  The government could implement a progressive model that determines how much someone contributes to his or her pension, with the wealthy paying the full amount and the very poor not having to pay at all.

Politically, the Chinese government must crack down on corruption. The government should strive for greater transparency, which would allow for more accountability as well as an environment less conducive to corruption.  The best way to deal with corruption is to instill a sense of purpose in government officials.  In China, political advancement is not so much based on competence, as it is dogma.  Those with connections advance over those with skill.  This creates a mismatch between doing good work and being rewarded. If China were to correct for this imbalance, it would create incentives for officials to care more about their work and more about doing a good job.  Such incentives would also instill a sense of purpose and more importantly a sense of care into government officials, which would significantly reduce corruption.

China faces large, growing problems, which include an unsustainable economic model, a failed One-Child policy, and political corruption.  Yet as large as these problems are, reforms to address them may have to be larger still.  But, the Chinese, like everyone else, simply want happiness and prosperity. They see the problems in the economy.  They see the unjust corruption in the government, and they are already asking for change.  Reforms, then, seem neither too large nor too troublesome. They have become necessary.

Photo credit: Flickr user CEPAL ONU

This article originally appeared in the winter edition of PPR on March 11, 2013.

By: Raquel MacGregor

After hearing Romney’s “I don’t want to go down the path to Spain” comment during the first U.S. 2012 presidential debate, I had to laugh at the irony of my choice of Seville, Spain for my semester abroad.  It seems I couldn’t have picked a worse time to live in Spain.  Poverty and unemployment are ubiquitous, there is widespread discontent with the government, and citizens are becoming desperate.  Spain is now bordering on the precipice of financial catastrophe.  Beginning when the housing bubble burst in 2008, the government has gone from surplus to massive deficit.  With unemployment wavering at around 25 – 40 percent for young adults, Spain’s economy barely has a pulse.  Unemployment in Andalucía, the region of Spain where I live, is close to 50 percent.  On top of that, the Spanish government has proposed a series of austerity measures in the public sector, including 40 billion euro (51.4 billion USD) in cuts, more than a quarter of Spain’s GDP.  These cuts include public sector salary freezes, tax increases, and departmental cuts across the board.  What do all these austerity measures breed? Public unrest, and lots of it.

The citizens are simply not happy with Prime Minister Rajoy’s “cut-all” approach. This year, there have been several protests involving hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in Madrid and Barcelona.  My recent trip to Madrid was almost cancelled because of the thousands of protesters scheduled to march the road in front of my hotel.  Even living in Seville, a city numbering only 700,000 inhabitants, I have witnessed substantially sized bi-weekly protests.  At demonstrations, Spaniards protest against any number of cost-cutting measures including the introduction of co-pays on medication, teacher salary cuts, and university tuition increase.  Essentially citizens protest any and all cuts.  Last week I had to duck and push through thousands of protesters just to get home during an internationally coordinated strike.  The week before, school was closed for another anti-austerity protest.  Paros académicos (academic halts) and huelgas (protests) constantly threaten to close universities for weeks or even months.  Missing school for days at a time is not a question of if but of when. I fear losing a semester of school credit if the protests continue.

Essentially, protests have become a part of my life.  When I first arrived in Seville, the lively civil disobedience animated and engaged me.  The protests were loud, vivacious, yet rarely violent.  I would often join in and ask questions; I loved the political engagement of the citizens.  Lately, however, the constant barrage of protests has become mundane.  Every day of protest costs Spain millions in lost productivity.  Missed days of class threaten the integrity of the entire public education system.  Yet, the government has not changed its stance.  What exactly is the Spanish public seeking to realistically accomplish? Although the resentment towards the cuts is completely understandable, there is little discussion of a resolution.

Spain’s simplest solution for its economic crisis – leaving the euro – seems unlikely.  The nation’s membership in the EU holds its currency at an artificially high rate.  Before the formation of the eurozone, Spain and other economies in crisis could undervalue their currency to regain competiveness in the global market.  Doing this would increase exports and reduce Spain’s trade deficit, which would help boost the national economy.  However, Spain’s membership in the euro prevents this from happening, and moreover, most Spaniard’s don’t seem thrilled to return to a currency that reminds them of a time of dictatorship and oppression.  Besides, even if Spain returned to pesetas, it would be unlikely to pull them out of the $2.4 trillion hole they’ve dug.

The Spanish government is trying to solve its financial crisis through cuts and bailouts from the EU without addressing the underlying problem.  Throwing money at failing banks is no better than putting band-aids on a body in multi-system organ failure.  Instead, the government needs to couple austerity cuts with domestic investments. Spanish leaders should heed the example of President Obama’s efforts to reboot the economy in the United States.  Obama has not simply increased taxes- he has invested in the manufacturing industry, education, and clean energy.  He has created tax cuts for small businesses.  He has poured money into infrastructure.  It is true that all these actions cost money, but all investments start with a down payment.  Spain, unlike the United States, has not introduced any sound investment plans in their road to recovery.  With their only strategy being $51.4 billion in state spending cuts, Spanish leaders are milking their citizens dry.

Instead of protesting public service cuts, citizens should instead insist on investment.  Spaniards need to take responsibility for their politicians’ failed economic strategies and suggest viable solutions.  Investment in tourism, Spain’s largest industry, is one possible avenue.  Spain also has a highly skilled workforce; 39% of the population aged 25-34 has a graduate education.  The country should thus focus on investment in the more highly specialized and scientific jobs for which it is already known, such as the aerospace and automotive industries.  Spain must retain its talent, not just its agriculture.  Investment is necessary.  Simply applying public sector cuts will only further shut down the economy.

However, one may ask, can Spain afford to invest at this point?  The answer, surprisingly, has hardly been discussed at the public level.  In fact, citizens, politicians, and the media never seem to bring up solutions to the crisis so discussions on the feasibility of domestic investment has not had much critique on either side.  The press constantly criticizes government policies but establishes few suggestions on the right course of action.  It seems that Spain’s real problem is its lack of intellectual discussion on finding a solution.

As an American living in Spain, I am astounded that a talented student graduating with a Ph.D. in engineering has little to no job prospects.  I am saddened that entire families live off of the pension of a single grandparent.  I am amazed that 10% of homes in Spain stand idle and crumbling while newlyweds move in with their parents.  Something is fundamentally wrong here.  Spain needs change, not cuts.

Photo credit: Flickr user patrick colgan

This article originally appeared in the winter edition of PPR on March 11, 2013.

By: Aidan McConnell

As Argentina contends with rising inflation, looming economic stagnation, and concerns about a return to authoritarianism, protests—some 700,000 strong—have rocked the streets of Buenos Aires and cities around the world. Comprised of predominantly middle-income Argentinian citizens, the demonstrations primarily stem from reforms and policy directives of the nation’s controversial president, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, and are fueled by complaints of food and energy costs as well as allegations of corporatist corruption.

With a political system characterized by leftist authoritarianism, charismatic legitimacy, and conflict precipitated by military coups, Argentina has had its fair share of internal disputes in its 196-year history as an independent nation. Kirchner, who rose to power in 2007 on a wave of working-class and rural support, followed nearly three decades of tumultuous change in the country’s power structure. This had included the Argentinian army’s loss of its mandate as the nation’s “moral reserve” in the Falkland Islands conflict in 1982, a failed set of neoliberal market-privatization measures in the 1990s, and a severe 2001 recession driven by capital flight and asset freezes. A member of the progressive Justicialist Party and First Lady of Argentina from 2003 to 2007, Kirchner was identified as a viable Peronist candidate in an environment that had become increasingly distrustful of capitalism and multilateral free trade agreements.  Additionally, Kirchner’s promotion of human rights and industrialist developmentalism resonated well with a population still recovering from state terrorism of a junta-led “Dirty War” and struggling with income stagnation in an integrated global economy.

The president is not unfamiliar with the confrontations, past and present, of Argentina’s polarized civil society and public discourse; in fact, her tenacity in overcoming challenges to her rational-legal legitimacy has endeared her to many of her supporters. The beginning of Kirchner’s first term saw protests in Buenos Aires and Argentina’s agricultural sectors following her administration’s decision to introduce a sliding-scale taxation system for food exports, which included a raise in the levy on soybeans from 35% to 44%. Despite a large-scale farming association walkout, Kirchner was able to use then-Vice President Julio Cobos and former government official Luis D’Elia as proxies to diffuse negative publicity. Later first-term situations, including allegations of impropriety and Kirchner’s unconstitutional attempts to remove Argentinian Central Bank President Martin Redrado by presidential decree, stayed largely within the government and did not significantly impact the viewpoints of the electorate.

Despite Kirchner’s multiple recoveries, precedent may not necessarily be a good predictor of the nature of her second term. Today, it seems that the same concerns and complaints that propelled Cristina Kirchner to power now have the potential to remove her from office. This year’s protests highlight a looming clash based on a multitude of structural problems that were ignored earlier in the 21^st century. Inflation— exasperated by Kirchner’s tax increases, a lack of support for wage rate suppression, and the creation of inefficient state-run enterprises— has ballooned to an unsustainable 24% per year. Infrastructural mismanagement and the nationalization of the Spanish-owned oil company YPF SA have dissuaded foreign capital from entering the Argentinian economy. Further complicating matters, a late-November downgrade by credit rating agency Fitch has placed the nation at risk of default.

Perhaps more troubling for Kirchner is that this time, her country’s economic woes coincide with policies that are viewed as overtly undemocratic. With the support of the pro-Peronist La Campora youth movement, Kirchner signed a bill on November 1 that lowered the national voting age from 18 to 16. Since the president polls well among younger voters, this move is regarded as an unabashed attempt to bolster political support for upcoming midterm elections. While the new law is ostensibly designed “to widen the electoral base of [Argentina’s] democracy,” skeptics, including Santiago Basabe of the Latin American Social Sciences Institute, assert that the “fundamental goal is indefinite reelection.” Such arbitrary readjustment appears even more sinister in the context of Kirchner’s proposal to increase regulations on the media, a policy that could give her the power to clamp down on dissenting voices in prominent publications and television stations. These concerns, along with news that Kirchner may attempt to initiate a constitutional amendment allowing her to seek a third term, have alarmed Argentinians across the political spectrum.

As such issues converge in 2013, it is unlikely that the Argentinian president will be able to rely on her usual comeback measures to retain power. While earlier many of Kirchner’s actions alienated only the upper-middle class of Argentina or remained internal to her government, now inflation and a lack of economic opportunities have disproportionately affected her primary base of support among lower-income households. As evidenced by power-grabbing schemes like the voting-age law or her proposed amendment, Kirchner has handled the growing opposition poorly. She appears to prefer readjusting the demographics in her favor instead of acknowledging policy failures and addressing the same trends that led to Argentina’s disastrous socioeconomic conditions in the early 2000s. Furthermore, the Kirchner administration’s recent use of the ongoing Falkland Islands dispute with Great Britain as a tool for political survival signifies a regime that is desperately looking for foreign distractions from emerging domestic strife—a saber-rattling method last observed during the waning years of the country’s despised military junta.

Indeed, as the president’s own power slips, Argentina’s national trajectory is at stake. A strong critic of full marketization, Kirchner has been instrumental in the growth of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) between Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil, and Venezuela. The leftist MERCOSUR, postured to provide a counterbalance to the United States’ Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), could receive a serious blow to its integrity if Argentina’s politics were to take a rightward turn toward a restriction on government controls. On the other hand, a relaxation of Kirchner’s grip on the economy could dramatically improve relations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which has repeatedly accused the president of manipulating inflation numbers to protect the national credit, and with the United States, a cautious investor of $15 billion in the Argentinian market. Additionally, a Kirchner loss or resignation could mark a transition from the internal focus of Peronist pro-working class policies to an emphasis on attracting middle and high-income careers from the global labor supply.

With scattered interests and a lack of a popular opposition leader, the anti-Kirchner movement does not yet have the support or efficacy to significantly destabilize the presidential administration. However, time is not on Kirchner’s side: if she decides to play political games with the problems of inflation, stagnation, and corruption, she may find herself the newest addition on a long list of deposed Argentinian leaders.

Photo credit: Flickr user El mundo, Economía y Negocios

This article originally appeared in the winter print edition of PPR on March 11, 2013.

By John Cheo

LET’S TAKE a walk down memory lane. Remember the kid in middle school with whom no one would form a team for a group project because he sounded, acted, dressed, or smelled weird? Or the kid in high school to whom an invitation to the coolest party would not be extended on similar grounds? Open, voluntary association with such a pariah was akin to social suicide. Indeed, keeping such a persona non grata at arm’s length seemed like the most sensible option, at least for someone most seized by matters reputational. However, suppose your objective had not been mere self-satisfaction but to help change the outcast for the better – a policy of isolation might have proven unwise. This assertion will be bolstered by an answer to a simple question: with regard to the need for him to change, would the aforementioned kid have been more receptive to the prodding of well-meaning acquaintances or condescending strangers?

Returning to the here and now, the recent opening up of Myanmar has been heralded by many as the nascent “normalization” of a hitherto pariah state. The reasons for what appears to be a profound change in Myanmar will undoubtedly be debated for a long time to come. It goes without saying that, as with most momentous and complex processes of political change, a concatenation of factors carried the day. To conclude, as some Western writers have, that it was above all Western sanctions which forced the hand of Naypyidaw would be a huge disservice to the pursuit of policies capable of promoting genuine democratic change i       n societies besieged by egregious and dictatorial regimes.

The West’s policy of isolation toward Myanmar, manifest in the slew of economic sanctions, was not unlike the shunning of the “weird” kid in our brief harkening back; the policy’s influence should accordingly not be overstated. By precluding any iota of foreign competition, sanctions contribute to an insular system under which local oligarchs and crony capitalists had little, if any, incentive to change the way they operated. Indeed, such a system hurt the layman more than the elites: The man whom many consider to be Myanmar’s richest – Tay Za – revealed in an interview with the Financial Times last August that sanctions have both greatly enriched him and strengthened the government. Perhaps more disconcertingly, as Thant Myint-U, grandson of the late United Nations Secretary-General U Thant, has noted, sanctions are also counterproductive to the extent that they hinder the emergence of the very classes of people on whom the best chances of democratic ferment depend.

A key factor often missing in the Western narrative of how Myanmar has opened up is the policy of principled engagement by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Like acquaintances who did not rush to merely condemn and exclude, ASEAN members admitted Myanmar into the regional grouping in 1997. Unsurprisingly, such a move was met with widespread chagrin on the part of many Western pundits and politicians more fixated on self-congratulatory moral postures than with finding a practicable solution for Myanmar’s woes. After nearly 15 years of both private and public diplomacy, it appears that the ‘ASEAN Way’ – loosely defined as (i) the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of member-states, (ii) an emphasis on informal, personal negotiations rather than formal, legalistic ones and (iii) group consensus over coercion by rule – has helped produce a Myanmar that is open to reform.

As some ASEAN advocates have pointed out, by forcing the officials and leaders of Myanmar to attend over a thousand ASEAN meetings held in various cities all across the region, ASEAN was able to ‘socialize’ the reclusive country to the norms of the world-at-large. In addition, the impetus for change is strengthened every time the military junta confronts for itself the unpalatable reality that Myanmar has fallen abysmally behind her regional neighbors, including those which gained independence with far dimmer prospects than her. Insofar as no ruling clique— no matter how misguided— wishes to lord over a chronically impoverished nation, the ‘demonstration effect’ of a generally prospering Southeast Asia right outside its doorsteps serves the reform agenda in Myanmar.

To be sure, the drama and dilemmas of international relations do not play out in the benign environment of a school; a lot more is at stake as powers jostle for their day in the sun. While leaving the social pariah in a school to his or her own devices will not represent a strategic disadvantage to anyone, isolating Myanmar will. This, the American and European policymakers and businesses are increasingly cognizant of: the former wish to cultivate good ties with President Thein Sein’s government with the unspoken desire to check the ascendant Chinese influence in Asia-Pacific while the latter want to profit from the region’s so-called “next economic frontier”. Of course, they also converge in their desire, or desperation, to climb out of the economic mess that currently afflicts much of the West; a potential new market of over 60 million can only be a good thing for both governments and corporations in the red.

Yet, many Asian observers cannot help but notice that a certain hypocrisy permeates the West’s recent reengagement of Myanmar. For example, three days after Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy won 43 out of 46 seats in the historic by-elections in April this year, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton declared that America “will continue our policy of engagement.” What engagement the Secretary was referring to, many Asian minds fail to grasp: in the span of nearly two decades from 1990 to 2009, direct face-to-face meetings between America and Myanmar’s senior officials were nonexistent. Bluntly put, even as the Middle East sapped away herculean proportions of America’s intellectual, military and diplomatic capital, succeeding administrations in Washington effectively left Myanmar to her own deplorable devices.

Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, the Baroness Kinnock of Holyhead, spokeswoman of the Labor Party for international development issues, pontificated on the BBC Radio 4’s World at One program that “We need to see interim measures, we need to see deadlines, we need to see benchmarks.” The tone of “holier-than-thou” is as regrettable as it is repulsive. Most damagingly, it perpetuates the farcical notion that the imposition of sanctions – a stick – without a concomitant investment in shrewd engagement efforts – a carrot – is a kind of diplomatic panacea when dealing with rogue countries. (For the unconvinced, perhaps a survey of the relations between Iran and the West might be instructive.)

ASEAN’s policy toward Myanmar, as a kind of ‘limestone diplomacy,’ is not flawless; narrow national interests among some ASEAN members have at times given the junta in Myanmar undeserved respite from the domestic clarion call for democracy. Yet on the whole, from a foreign policy standpoint, it must be said that an imperfect policy of engagement triumphs a perfect policy of isolation. While the former eschews ideological puritanism in favor of the pragmatic pursuit of reform, the latter, animated chiefly by its procrustean impulses, is gravely ill-suited for a pluralistic world.

In early October, as I watched the Rumble debate between Jon Stewart and Bill O’Reilly in the company of my American friends atop Harrison House, many were moved to clap after Stewart, in a tone of utmost seriousness, said, “This idea that disagreeing with somebody, even vehemently, even to the core of your principles means that you should not engage them is ridiculous.” If the liberal democratic West can live up to this ideal beyond its borders, perhaps millions more around the world will clap, too.

Photo Credit: Flickr user bsmethers