December Thaw

By: Logan Bayroff

For the first time in quite a long time, something new is happening in Russia. Sure, the former superpower has popped up in the news now and then since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Stories about saber-rattling autocrats and obscenely rich oligarchs are always popular with journalists, and the sordid corruption and crime that accompanies them have helped create the popular image of Russia as an Eastern European version of Christopher Nolan’s Gotham City. Russians have supported strongman Vladimir Putin for over a decade largely because he seemed to be able to impose order on the chaos. Compared to the Wild West capitalism days of the nineteen nineties, the streets seem safer, the world more normal. Thanks to the relative stability and the boon of petro-dollars, an urban upper-middle class has begun to rise. This in itself is a very noteworthy development in a country that has historically been largely divided into two groups – the small ruling elite, and everyone else. Yet the new bourgeoisie has been content to accept thinly disguised autocracy and cronyism.  Putin and his circle of advisers and protégés have remained firmly in control of the country, and outside of fringe groups and the blogosphere, the status quo has gone unchallenged. Until now.

Starting with President Dmitri Medvedev’s September 24^th announcement that Putin (who had been serving as primer minister for the past four years) would seek a return to the presidency in the coming March elections, opposition to the ruling authorities has sprouted to an extent not seen in years. First there were only small signs of unrest – an increase in disgruntled chatter among liberal politicians and internet commentators, the resignation of a well-respected finance minister, the booing of Putin and his ruling United Russia party at sporting events. The real fireworks began with the December 4^th parliamentary elections, which brought a major decline in seats for the ruling party and allegations of widespread fraud. On December 10^th, over fifty thousand people came out in the streets of Moscow to protest the fraud and Putin’s regime, with smaller groups in other cities throughout the country. Compared to the street protests of the Arab Spring the numbers were insignificant. But compared to the tiny handfuls that have usually turned out for political protests since the fall of the Soviet Union, this was an earthquake. Suddenly criticism of the regime and the entire political system became rampant, moving into the mainstream of the Russian media. Many predicted that the protest would be a one-off, with no lasting momentum. But on December 24^th an even larger crowd turned out to an officially sanctioned protest in Moscow. This time liberal politicians and Soviet-era dissidents were joined by former prominent members of the regime in addressing the crowd, which chanted, among other things, “Russia without Putin!” Whatever is going on, it doesn’t appear to be going away anytime soon.

Russians now find themselves facing two major questions: Is real political change possible? And, considering the existing alternatives to Putin is it even desirable? On the surface, a great deal has changed already. Politics, typically a dirty word in Russia, has become a central focus again for millions. Faced with widespread discontent and the ominous precedent of the Arab Spring revolts, the government yielded to protestors by granting them permission to conduct rallies and by allowing the major television networks to cover the protests in depth. The Kremlin has reassigned parliament speaker Boris Gryzlov and propaganda chief Vladislav Surkov, both extremely unpopular figures associated with autocratic control. The departing Medvedev has spoken of the need to listen to the protestors and carry out “comprehensive” political reforms. Yet Putin himself has publically treated the protests as insignificant, refusing to meet with opposition figures. Convinced that he can fall back on his base of “real” working-class Russians, he seems determined to outlast his critics, win an ugly election victory in March, and move forward largely unscathed. As things stand, this remains the most likely scenario.

For Russia to experience a transformation that is more than skin deep, it will need to see the rise of a unified opposition, with an attractive enough platform and leader to rally support from the masses. This is easier said than done. “Political opposition” has long been an oxymoron in a country that has experienced hundreds of years of the most centralized autocratic rule. Even in the “new” Russia, it has remained a largely irrelevant wasteland. Putin and his supporters have long defended the regime by pointing out that the alternatives are far worse – after all, the two opposition parties that regularly gain the most votes are the Communists and the xenophobic nationalists (officially called, ironically, the Liberal Democrats). Some are wont to point to this as evidence that a major change in Russia can only lead to disaster, in a similar fashion to those who fear the Islamists waiting to capitalize on the Arab revolutions. Yet in Russia the absence of a political alternative is largely systemic, a central aspect of the regime’s method of control. The Kremlin decides which political parties and candidates are allowed to register for elections. It carefully denies both legitimacy and television coverage to serious, reform-oriented opposition figures, granting them instead to the extreme parties of the “systemic opposition,” which often attract voters simply because they’re not Putin. The regime has also worked to create an atmosphere in which partisan politics itself is viewed as unsavory, unchanging, and ultimately unworthy of the decent, average Russian. This has not been difficult in a country already scarred by countless historical traumas and utopias gone wrong. Apathy and skepticism are pervasive. Putin’s government has been based on a simple bargain with the people – we give you relative quiet and stability, and you leave the decision-making to us.

Yet a legitimate opposition is growing. It is already light years ahead of where it stood just a month ago. Veteran liberal figures like Grigory Yavlinsky and Boris Nemtsov retain some popularity and have stood at the forefront of the protests. Alexei Kudrin, a well-respected former minister, addressed the most recent protest and has expressed interest in forming a new moderate party to challenge the Kremlin. Most intriguing of all is Alexei Navalny, a dynamic thirty-five year old blogger and activist with a massive online following. Having coined the extremely popular term “party of crooks and thieves” to describe the United Russia party, Navalny appears ready to build on his growing base of support and seek real political power. None of these figures is yet strong enough to stand on their own. But if the liberal opposition can end its perennial squabbling amongst itself and finally form a united front, the threat to Putin’s hold on power will increase dramatically.

The ultimate outcome will depend, of course, on the Russian people. Russian commentators seeking an explanation for the sudden surge of political action are fond of pointing to the research of American sociologist Ronald Inglehart, who has linked modernization and increased prosperity to growth in the desire for democracy and self-realization. Putin’s policies may have enabled the growth of the middle class – but now they want freedoms and autonomy that he does not appear willing to give them. Can they take them for themselves? And if they got them, could they keep them? After all the false promises of the past, it is easy to skeptically dismiss the possibility of a better Russia. Yet Russians have shocked the world before. Dismiss them at your own peril.

Photo credit: Flickr user sime simon

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